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Abstract 
This study analyzes the impact of the Navy’s Tuition Assistance (TA) program 
on the retention and job performance of first-term Navy enlisted personnel.  Prior 
studies analyzing the retention effect of the Navy’s TA program have produced 
conflicting results—one study finding that participants are more likely to leave the 
Navy, the other study finding they are more likely to stay.  Our analysis of this 
relationship has several advantages over the prior studies. First, the analysis 
exploits a unique feature in the data to create a natural control group that allows us 
to adjust for the potential selection bias. Second, we use a larger data set consisting 
of cohorts of recruits who entered the Navy between 1994 and 2001.  The recruits 
are tracked during their first five years of service.  We find that first term sailors who 
use TA to enroll in college classes have a significantly higher probability of 
reenlistment and of promotion to both E4 and to E5 than those who participate but 
do not complete their courses.  While these results are robust to the controls for 
selection, the results indicate that self-selection into the program is likely to explain 
as much as one-half of the baseline retention effect.  An additional finding is that 
women and minorities are more likely to take college-courses and that retention and 
promotion rates of women and minority TA participants tend to be better than their 
peers.  
Keywords: Tuition Assistance (TA) program, first-term Navy enlisted 
personnel, retention 
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Executive Summary 
This study analyzes the impact of the Navy’s Tuition Assistance (TA) program 
on the retention and job performance of first-term Navy enlisted personnel.  Although 
two prior studies were available that analyzed the retention effect of the Navy’s TA 
program, they produced conflicting results—one study found that participants are 
more likely to leave the Navy, while the second found that they are more likely to 
stay.  What is more surprising about these conflicting findings is that both studies 
used the same data on Navy enlistees who entered in 1992.  This divergence in 
results demonstrates the inherent difficulties in establishing reliable causal effects on 
the behavior of program participants in program evaluation studies. Given the lack of 
consistent and reliable results on the program’s impact and the absence of a 
convincing analysis of the return on investment in this program, the Navy requested 
that another study of the Tuition Assistance program be conducted.  This report 
presents the results of our study of the TA program 
Our analysis of the Tuition Assistance program has several advantages over 
earlier studies. First, we use a large sample of cohorts of recent recruits who entered 
the Navy between 1994 and 2001.  For each new recruit we have data on their 
characteristics each year during their first term of service. Second, the data covers 
multiple cohorts (as opposed to the single cohort analyzed in the earlier studies) and 
represents a period when the TA program was expanding.  Thus, the results are 
more likely to be externally valid than the prior studies; that is, our results are more 
likely to apply to the current (2008) environment and population of first-term sailors 
than the results of earlier studies that focused on a single cohort of recruits.  Third, 
our study expands the scope of analysis to include program effects on sailor 
performance as well as on retention.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our 
study differs in the methodological approach we adopt to deal with the inherent 
selection problem that affects statistical estimates of program effects.  Unlike earlier 
studies that use instrumental variable techniques to solve potential selection 
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problems, we develop a natural control group to derive the causal effect of the TA 
program.  
Our study focuses on the first term of service for sailors who entered the Navy 
between 1994 and 2001.  We restrict the sample to recruits with 4-year obligations.  
These recruits are observed during their first 5 years of service to determine whether 
they attrite before the end of their initial contract or they reenlist or extend.  The 
statistical analysis uses MEPCOM data on the characteristics of new recruits at 
entry and data from the Defense Manpower Data Center on career outcomes such 
as promotion, attrition, and reenlistment.  The Navy Center for Personal and 
Professional Development provided data on TA course enrollments and course 
grades.  
The statistical analysis relies on an estimation of multivariate models of the 
main behavioral outcomes.  The first model analyzes the determinants of 
participation in the TA program during the first term of service.  This model 
investigates whether the observed differences in TA usage rates are explained by 
individual attributes, such as educational attainment prior to enlistment or ability. 
Next, we estimate a reenlistment model in which the dependent variable measures 
whether the individual sailors reenlist or extend at their first decision point.  Finally, 
we estimate the probability of achieving the rank of E-4 and E-5 by the 5th year of 
service. The re-enlistment and promotion models include race/ethnicity, gender, 
education, AFQT scores, marital status and dependents as control variables. In 
addition, all models include fiscal year dummies and rating dummies. 
The analysis exploits a natural internal comparison group in the data to 
control for the potential bias due to self-selection of sailors into the TA program. The 
evidence is drawn from sailors who apply for TA assistance and enroll in college 
courses but who are forced by external circumstance (e.g., deployments and 
emergencies) to withdraw. The pool of those who withdraw provides a natural 
control group for those who successfully complete their college courses via TA.  
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Findings 
The TA participation rate in this sample is .22, which is based on the rate for 
all eight accession cohorts during their 5-year service period.  Women used TA at 
twice the rate of men (27% vs. 12%).  Women also had higher successful course 
completion rates than men (81% vs. 77%).  The mean reenlistment rate of TA users 
in our data exceeds that of non-users by 12 points (about 20%).  In addition, the 
promotion rate to E4 and E5 was 3.6 points and 5.4 points higher, respectively, for 
TA users. 
The results of the multivariate models of TA participation confirm the 
differences in means observed in the bivariate comparisons.  Participation rates for 
women are 18 percentage points higher (nearly double) those of men, holding all 
other factors constant.  In addition, most minorities, except Native Americans, are 
more likely to use TA than are whites.  
Estimates of the TA effect in models that are not corrected for individual 
heterogeneity will be biased if participants are not randomly selected. Sailors who 
voluntarily participate in TA may be more motivated or have higher ability than 
sailors who do not take any college courses. Furthermore, these characteristics are 
likely to be correlated with job performance and the probability of re-enlistment.  Our 
approach to adjust the estimates for selection bias is to use a sample consisting 
solely of TA users and to compare successful course completers with enrollees who 
do not complete their courses. We assume that all participants who use TA to enroll 
in college courses share similar motivation, initiative, and aptitude, but some are 
unable to complete the courses for exogenous reasons. Such reasons are often 
related to military deployments and other job duties beyond the individual’s control. 
We use this exogenous variation in course completion among TA participants to 
estimate the program effect.  
The results of the selection-adjusted indicate that TA users have re-
enlistment rates that exceed those of non-participants by 6.2 percentage points.  
Since the overall re-enlistment rate in this sample is .68, this represents an increase 
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in reenlistment rates of about 9%.  This effect is about one-half of the effect in the 
unadjusted estimates, suggesting there is an upward bias when no correction is 
made for individual heterogeneity.   
The results of the promotion models using the full sample show that TA 
participation increases the probability of promotion to E-4 by 14.1 percentage points 
(about 23%). Again, there is some concern that these estimates are biased upward 
due to unobserved characteristics that affect TA participation and that are likely to be 
correlated with promotion.  When we restrict the sample to only TA participants, the 
estimates indicate that course completers have a promotion rate only 3 points (about 
5%) above that of non-completers. This pattern is repeated for the E5 promotion 
outcomes.  In the full sample, TA appears to increase E5 promotion by 6.1 points 
(30%), but in the selection-adjusted estimates, this effect falls to 4.9 points (20%). 
The average effects estimated for the full samples mask some important 
differences within demographic groups, especially blacks and women.  African-
American recruits who participate in TA are more likely to reenlist than white TA-
users by about 13.6 percentage points (or 20%).  In addition, within the African-
American group, those who participate in TA also are more likely to reenlist than 
non-participant African-Americans by about 14.4 percentage points (or 21%).  
Similarly, African-Americans course completers are more likely to promote to E4 
than African Americans who use TA but fail to complete their studies. This promotion 
advantage is 4.5 points (7.4%).  Finally, among African Americans, course 
completion boosts E5 promotion rates by 4.6 points (22%).  
In general, women are less likely to reenlist than are men.  However, women 
who complete TA courses are more likely to reenlist than women who do not 
complete their courses (by 13%). This indicates that TA usage may have a positive 
effect on female retention, but this effect may be prone to endogeneity bias. These 
results also seem to indicate that TA may be an important reason for women to join 
and remain in the military, since the gender retention gap is about twice as large 
when analyzing course completion than when focusing on any TA use at all. The 
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gender gap in promotion probabilities does not change much after restricting the 
sample. However, TA continues to have a positive (although much smaller) effect on 
female promotion rates.  
In summary, the statistical analysis finds that first-term sailors who use TA to 
enroll in undergraduate college classes have a significantly higher probability of 
reenlistment and of promotion to both E4 and to E5 than those who participate but 
do not complete their courses. Additional findings suggest that women and 
minorities are more likely to take college-courses and that retention and promotion 
rates of women and minority TA participants tend to be higher than their 
counterparts. 
We also conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis of the TA program.  Based 
on our multivariate models, we were able to quantify and monetize the benefits 
associated with the higher retention (and an associated increase in average 
experience levels) and with the higher promotion outcomes.  Based on previous 
estimates of the costs of increasing reenlistments via Selective Reenlistment 
Bonuses (SRB), we calculated the TA impact on retention saved the Navy between 
$57 million (a lower-bound estimate) and $125 million (an upper-bound estimate) 
annually.  Based on annual program expenditures of $95 million, the program is 
cost-effective, using the upper-bound estimate but is not cost-effective using the 
lower-bound estimate.  However, this calculation ignores numerous other potential 
benefits of the program, which we were not able to quantify.  These include its 
potential effect on recruitment, its effect on the cross-rating of sailors to more 
technical ratings, its effect on sailors applying and qualifying for enlisted 
commissioning programs, and its demonstrated effect in this study on improving the 
Navy’s diversity goals.  When these important non-quantifiable benefits are 
considered in the cost-benefit assessment, it is our judgment that the Tuition 
Assistance program is a cost-effective program. 
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Recommendations 
In a recent Education Quick Poll (2006) over 84-95% of respondents in pay 
grades E2-E7 reported that that a college degree would benefit them professionally 
(Uriell, Patrissi, Newell, & Whittam).  Moreover, a clear majority in all three pay 
grade groupings (E2-E3, E4-E5, and E6-E7) agreed with the statement that 
“Educational Opportunities in Navy Positively Impact My Decision to Make Navy a 
Career.”  (Uriell, Patrissi, Newell, & Whittam).  However, respondents also reported 
significant obstacles to TA participation; 78%-83% of those in pay grades E2-E5 
reported it was not “easy to schedule courses.” The most common reasons cited for 
difficulties in scheduling classes were a “lack of time” and “conflicts between work 
and education.”  Both factors were cited by roughly half of all respondents in all pay 
grades.  Another barrier sailors identified was the “annual TA limit.” 
The results in this paper suggest that the Navy should consider policies that 
encourage TA participation and, in particular, encourage course completion by those 
who enroll in college classes. Sailors’ suggestions on what could be done to make it 
easier to obtain a college degree seem to provide a base for recommendations to 
policy makers.  The three top policies sailors recommended were: (1) to provide time 
off for classes during duty hours; (2) provide more flexible work schedules that 
accommodate courses; and (3) increase TA reimbursement rates. In particular, they 
recommended fully funding TA for degree completion and removing the 16-semester 
credit hour annual maximum.  Finally, the results strongly suggest that sailors should 
be encouraged to use educational counseling services at Navy College Offices and 
to develop an individual educational plan.  This plan would assist them in identifying 
the classes most closely associated with their career goals.  This should improve 
course completion rates.  Finally, the Navy should consider a more sailor-friendly 
policy of granting waivers for classes that sailors who were unable to complete due 
to work-related reasons.  Sailors will always have to deploy and work schedules will 
continue to change frequently.  However, sailors should not be penalized for such 
work-related changes; otherwise, incentives to use the TA program will be 
weakened.  
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Introduction  
The observation that many organizations, for-profit and non-profit alike, often 
subsidize general education for their employees presents a challenge to the investment 
in human capital model (Becker, 1964). The human capital model suggests that profit-
seeking firms operating in a competitive labor market will not invest in general education 
that has the effect of improving the labor market value of their employees.  Despite this 
prediction, surveys indicate that the practice of subsidizing all or a portion of employees’ 
costs of taking college- or graduate-level classes is widespread, with one survey 
indicating that 61% of private firms that employ 50 or more employees offer a tuition 
reimbursement program (Flaherty, 2007).  In sharp contrast to the predictions of the 
human capital model, firms also indicate that one of the main reasons for offering tuition 
reimbursement programs is to reduce employee turnover (Flaherty, 2007). It appears 
that either the actual incentive structure in many internal labor markets is at odds with 
the implications of human capital theory or labor markets are not as competitive as the 
traditional model assumes.  
Alternative theories have been advanced to explain why sponsoring general 
education may be beneficial for a firm. One hypothesis is that such employee benefits 
bond employees to the firm and allow it to extract more value from investments in firm-
specific training (Glick & Feuer, 1984). The longer tenure could be because education 
subsidies may increase job satisfaction and loyalty to the firm. Another hypothesis is 
that education benefits are a component of the employee's overall compensation 
package, which would tend to improve job satisfaction and, indirectly, recruiting and 
retention. This particular fringe benefit may also attract higher-quality applicants than 
alternative benefit packages (Capelli, 2004). General education also may complement 
firm-specific training and may directly benefit the firm by increasing worker productivity. 
If general education enhances firm-specific skills, it can increase workers’ pay and 
internal promotion prospects and, as a consequence, retention (Flaherty, 2007). 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Autor (2001) hypothesize that investments in general 
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education may not increase turnover if individuals’ search and mobility costs give firms 
some monopsony power in the labor market.  
Very few studies to date have empirically evaluated these hypotheses. Feuer, 
Glick, and Desai (1987) find that firms that sponsor education have lower turnover. They 
find, however, that wages are similar for firms that sponsor general education and those 
that do not. Cappelli (2004) also finds that firms sponsoring general education have 
lower turnover rates. In contrast, Krueger and Rouse (1998) find no difference in 
turnover rates in two firms sponsoring literacy programs. One of the biggest challenges 
of this literature is data availability and quality. Studies using data from the private 
sector are limited to comparisons of firms that sponsor general education to those that 
do not. Ideally, it should be observed which individuals within the firm use general 
education subsidies and how their careers and turnover rates compare to those who do 
not use the subsidies. Recent studies have improved in this regard by using public 
sector data, which offer more detail on individual usage rates and careers. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) sponsors education for recruits, for many of whom 
educational benefits are a primary reason for enlisting. Military administrative data offer 
details on courses and grades and also identify individual participation and intensity of 
participation in the programs.  
Despite the more accurate data, the empirical literature on tuition reimbursement 
programs in the Navy currently does not provide a definite answer to the question of 
whether general education subsidies reduce turnover. In fact, this literature to date has 
produced conflicting results about the effect of general education subsidies on retention. 
Garcia and Joy (1998) and Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2002) find that tuition 
reimbursement improves retention. Buddin and Kapur (2002, 2005) produce estimates 
that indicate the opposite and attribute the prior findings to spurious correlation and 
endogenous instruments.  
This divergence in results may be due ,in part, to the inherent difficulties in 
establishing convincing causal effects in program evaluation studies. This is especially 
important in this case since workers who voluntarily choose to take advantage of tuition 
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reimbursement programs most likely systematically differ from those who do not. A 
second difficulty in obtaining causal effects stems from the difficulties in identifying the 
relevant sample. What seems to drive differences in the estimated program effects in 
this literature is not the methodological approach, but rather the restrictions that are 
imposed on the sample of sailors. In particular, the group of sailors assigned to the 
control group differs significantly between the two studies.  Buddin and Kapur (2002, 
2005) claim that recruits who leave the Navy before the end of their first contract do not 
have the same opportunity to take college courses and therefore need to be removed 
from the sample. By applying this sample restriction to the data used by Garcia and Joy 
(1998) and Garcia et al. (2002), they estimate negative retention effects of Navy tuition 
reimbursement programs. Overall, this literature focuses on turnover, without 
investigating why and how general education subsidies may affect turnover. In 
particular, no on has attempted to examine the direct productivity effects of such 
programs.  
This study examines the effects of the Navy’s tuition reimbursement program on 
enlisted personnel and offers several improvements over prior studies. In particular, the 
study analyzes the effect of program participation on enlistees’ voluntary first-term 
retention decisions using a panel of several recent cohorts of Navy recruits. Given the 
recent increase in educational attainment in the general population, more recent data 
allow us to observe rates of participation in the tuition reimbursement program that 
exceed prior studies by about 100-150%. We also assess the direct job productivity 
effects of additional general education by investigating career progression and 
promotion rates of participants. Most importantly, the study offers improved causal 
estimates of the effects of the tuition reimbursement program on these outcomes. Prior 
studies have attempted to deal with selection bias using instrumental variables (IV) 
techniques and propensity score matching. The instruments used in the Garcia and Joy 
(1998) and Garcia et al. (2002) analyses are strongly correlated with participation but 
most likely are endogenous, whereas the instruments that are used in the more recent 
work by Buddin and Kapur (2002, 2005) are weakly correlated with participation. In 
contrast, this study exploits a unique feature of the data to control for selection and to 
identify the direct education effect of the program on retention and job productivity. More 
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specifically, we exploit the fact that a number of sailors enroll in college-level courses 
but withdraw due to external (and most likely exogenous) circumstances, such as 
deployments, emergencies, or changes in work schedules. This group suggests a 
natural comparison that nets out motivation and ability when considering the choice to 
undertake more education.  
We find that the tuition reimbursement program in the Navy improves retention of 
first-term sailors.  However, our estimated effects are considerably reduced in models 
that control for self-selection into the program and are lower than those estimated in 
previous studies. We also find that those who make use of Navy-sponsored education 
are more likely to be promoted than their counterparts. These effects appear to vary 
across gender and race categories. In particular, we find that women and minorities are 
more likely to take college courses and their retention and promotion rates are 
disproportionately better than those of white males.  
This study is organized into six sections. Section II describes the Department of 
Defense’s Voluntary Education program and reviews prior studies on the effects of 
employer-subsidized education on the retention of civilian employees as well as 
enlistees. Section III describes the data and presents descriptive statistics for the 
relevant samples.  Section IV presents the results of the statistical analysis, and Section 
V provides conclusions and recommendations.     
 - 5 - 
Background  
The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Voluntary Education program (VOLED) is 
one of the largest employer-sponsored education programs in the world. VOLED allows 
members of the armed forces to attend courses during off-duty periods, and each year 
over 340,000 service members participate in post-secondary education courses (Faram, 
2008).  Students pursue different academic credentials, including high school diplomas, 
GEDs, non-degree programs aiming to improve basic academic skills, as well as 
undergraduate or graduate degrees. Expenditures (in nominal and real terms) on 
voluntary education programs between 1985 and 2006 are shown in Table 1.   
Table 1.   VOLED Expenditures by Service and Year  
in Nominal and Constant (2006) Dollars   
(Navy Center for Professional and Personal Development, 2007) 
  Nominal Dollars Constant 2006 Dollars 
FY Army Navy USMC USAF Total Army Navy USMC USAF Total
1985 25.0 15.9 7.9 34.4 83.2 48.5 30.8 15.3 66.7 161.4
1986 65.8 21.6 9.8 40.0 137.2 126.3 41.5 18.8 76.8 263.4
1987 49.1 19.7 9.3 46.9 125.1 92.4 37.1 17.6 88.2 235.2
1988 27.1 18.8 7.6 43.4 96.9 49.7 34.5 13.9 79.6 177.6
1989 29.1 15.4 7.2 36.9 88.6 51.7 27.4 12.8 65.5 157.4
1990 32.6 18.6 7.3 36.2 94.7 55.7 31.8 12.5 61.9 161.8
1991 31.7 20.2 7.6 34.2 93.7 52.4 33.4 12.6 56.6 155.0
1992 38.2 24.5 9.5 46.9 119.1 61.6 39.5 15.3 75.6 192.1
1993 40.2 23.8 9.0 49.0 122.0 63.2 37.4 14.1 77.0 191.7
1994 38.2 24.4 9.7 57.6 129.9 58.6 37.4 14.9 88.4 199.3
1995 36.3 24.0 10.1 56.3 126.7 54.2 35.8 15.1 84.0 189.0
1996 36.1 20.8 10.9 53.1 120.9 52.2 30.1 15.8 76.8 174.9
1997 38.1 27.4 11.6 53.8 130.9 53.8 38.7 16.4 75.9 184.7
1998 38.2 30.9 13.0 49.4 131.5 52.9 42.8 18.0 68.5 182.3
1999 45.8 33.0 13.9 54.8 147.5 61.8 44.6 18.8 74.0 199.1
2000 48.5 35.8 16.7 56.2 157.2 62.8 46.3 21.6 72.7 203.4
2001 54.5 38.0 17.4 64.1 174.0 67.9 47.3 21.7 79.8 216.6
2002 58.9 42.6 18.5 67.2 187.2 71.7 51.8 22.5 81.8 227.8
2003 157.3 58.7 35.4 120.2 371.6 185.0 69.0 41.6 141.4 437.0
2004 217.4 71.3 37.7 140.6 467.0 245.0 80.4 42.5 158.5 526.3
2005 211.8 72.6 37.6 139.4 461.4 225.1 77.2 40.0 148.2 490.5
2006 140.9 95.2 45.5 149.4 431.0 140.9 95.2 45.5 149.4 431.0
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From Table 1 it appears that VOLED expenditures have increased considerably 
across all services in the past two decades. The most dramatic increases, however, 
have occurred since the early 2000s.    
Table 2 provides the number of enrollments in the various educational 
components of the Voluntary Education program by service branch. The four 
components are high school diploma classes, remedial education classes (“basic 
skills”), undergraduate college classes, and graduate classes.  Table 2 shows that the 
undergraduate college program is by far the largest component of the Defense 
Department’s Voluntary Education program. All the service branches have experienced 
increased enrollments in recent years in the college (undergraduate and graduate) 
programs, with the exception of the Army.  Falling Army enrollments may be due to the 
extensive deployment of soldiers overseas.  The Navy’s undergraduate enrollment also 
includes enrollments in the Navy College Program for Afloat College Education 
(NCPACE).  Note that course enrollment is not the same as the number of individuals 
participating, because an individual may take more than one course in a given year. 
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Table 2.   Voluntary Education Enrollments by Service  
(After:  DOD Voluntary Education Online, 2007) 
Branch YEAR High School 
Basic 
Skills Undergraduate Graduate
ARMY 2006 146 12,616 238,479 26,178 
  2005 55 15,577 255,945 29,541 
  2004 118 19,072 319,451 37,018 
        
NAVY 2006 58 10,004 176,318* 15,576 
  2005 63 10,811 168,927* 13,261 
  2004 87 13,547 165,545* 12,907 
        
MARINE 
CORPS 2006 8 3,802 69,839 4,766 
  2005 6 1,996 67,447 4,624 
  2004 7 2,534 67,503 4,860 
        
AIR 
FORCE 2006 0 1,450 225,586 42,229 
  2005 10 2,239 238,464 41,317 
  2004 74 3,236 269,545 44,648 
        
TOTAL 
DOD 2006 212 27,872 710,222 88,749 
  2005 134 30,623 730,783 88,743 
  2004 286 38,389 822,044 99,433 
   Note:  *Navy Undergraduate Contains NCPACE Data 
   Source:  CPPD 
Table 3 shows the number of enlisted sailors participating in TA by year and by 
rank.  The annual participation rate averages about 18% of the total enlisted force.  
Table 3 also shows that participation is low for sailors in the early grades (E1-E2) and 
peaks in the middle grades (E4-E6).  This is not surprising as sailors in the entry grades 
are occupied with completing basic recruit training and occupational training and have 
little time for off-duty education. 
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Table 3.   Individual TA Participants by Year and Rank  
(CPPD, 2007)  
Rank   2004   2005   2006   2007* 
E1    294    330    445    356 
E2  1,209  1,212  1,362  1,221 
E3  6,453  6,267  5,914  4,646 
E4 10,008  9,696 10,100  7,734 
E5 16,317 17,543 17,858 14,469 
E6  12,027 13,815 14,876 11,703 
E7  5,981  6,707  7,416  6,246 
E8  1,833  2,064  2,274  1,817 
E9    673    719    746    608 
Total 54,795 58,353 60,991 48,800 
Percent of end 
strength 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.16 
   Note:  *Partial year data 
The goal of the Navy’s VOLED program is to cultivate the career potential of its 
sailors and marines by providing opportunities to increase educational attainment.  In 
addition to the personal benefits, the Navy looks to increase the retention and readiness 
of quality personnel and strengthen job performance, while promoting a culture of 
continuous learning (Secretary of the Navy, 2005).  The Navy’s goal is to ensure that 
sailors have the opportunity to participate in the VOLED programs regardless of mission 
or duty assignment.  Garcia and Joy (1998) provide a detailed description of the Navy’s 
VOLED program. 
Navy College Program for Afloat College Education (NCPACE) 
The Navy assists sailors while deployed at sea by providing the opportunity to 
continue their education through Navy College Program for Afloat College Education 
(NCPACE).  NCPACE is part of the Navy College Program and provides both academic 
skills courses and undergraduate and graduate college courses.  The courses are 
offered through accredited colleges and universities and are provided tuition-free to 
sailors except for the costs of textbooks and other educational materials required (DoD 
Voluntary Education Online, 2007). 
Table 4.   Navy PACE Enrollments and Courses Taken   
(DOD Voluntary Education Online, 2007) 
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NCPACE 
TOTALS   
Instructor 




ents Courses  
Enroll-
ments Courses  
Enroll-
ments Courses 
2007* 6,483 8,359  2,878 3,698  3,680 4,661 
2006 15,538 25,105  8,779 13,903  7,356 11,202 
2005 13,048 20,918  7,681 11,873  5,925 9,045 
2004 12,065 18,269  7,192 10,888  5,206 7,381 
2003 15,209 24,221  9,239 13,618  6,460 10,603 
2002 15,453 26,169  9,306 14,730  6,824 11,439 
2001 17,905 30,638  11,190 18,696  7,519 11,942 
2000 16,018 27,558  10,111 16,320  6,674 11,238 
1999 13,169 21,172  7,976 12,511  5,813 8,661 
1998 9,464 13,357   6,612 9,486   3,088 3,871 
Note: *FY07 Data Incomplete 
The Tuition Assistance (TA) Program 
This study focuses on the largest component of the VOLED program: the Tuition 
Assistance (TA) program.  Prior to 2002, the TA program reimbursed sailors for 75% of 
tuition.  In 2002, the reimbursement rate was increased to 100% of tuition and fees, not 
to exceed $250 per semester hour (a maximum of 16 credits per year), $166.67 per 
quarter hour (a limit of 24), and $16.67 per hour (a limit of 240).  To qualify, sailors must 
meet the following criteria:  
(a) Advancement-eligible Sailors must have taken and passed most recent 
advancement examination; (b) Must pass (or be medically waived) from the most 
recent physical readiness test; (c) Must not be under instruction in initial skills 
training or in a duty-under-instruction training status; (d) Must be recommended 
for promotion or advancement (as applicable); (e) Have not been awarded non-
judicial or courts-martial punishment within the previous six months; and (f) 
Enlisted personnel with less than twenty years in-service are required to have at 
least one year remaining on their current enlistment contract prior to using TA. 
(NAVADMIN, 2007a) 
In 2006, the Navy spent $127.9 million on all components of its VOLED program. 
Expenditures on the TA component were $95.2 million, or about 74% of total VOLED 
expenditures.  Expenditures on TA have increased considerably in recent years.  Prior 
to 2001, annual spending on TA averaged around $37 million (2006 dollars). In 2006, 
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60,991 individuals (about 18% of all enlisted personnel) enrolled in roughly 176,000 
college courses, an average of more than two college classes per participant per year.1  
After 2001, the Navy’s TA budget increased sharply.  A partial explanation for 
this increase in spending may lie with the 2001 Executive Review of Naval Training.  In 
addition to identifying areas of potential training improvement for the Navy, the study 
pointed out that the Navy was losing a large portion of its recruitable market.  According 
to Kennedy (2002) “between 1974 and 1999, the number of non-college bound high-
school graduates—the Navy’s traditional enlisted recruiting market—decreased by 
almost forty percent.”  This decrease was caused by a proportionate increase in college 
enrollment.  The review recommended that the Navy increase the emphasis on off-duty 
education as a way to increase recruiting and retention prospects.  Perhaps due to this 
renewed dedication to education tuition reimbursement rates were raised from 75% to 
100% in 2002.    
The importance of education in sailors’ careers was strengthened when the Navy 
decided to require an Associate degree for promotion to E8 by 2010.  However, that 
requirement was dropped in early 2008 and was replaced by the “Enlisted Learning and 
Development Strategy” in April 2008 (Faram, 2008, p. 8).  The strategy maps required 
professional military education and training courses into the career paths for every Navy 
rating.  Of key importance for this research, the strategy also builds off-duty education 
(via TA) into career paths.  As sailors reach the petty officer grades, the strategy 
envisions greater emphasis on off-duty education and “rating-relevant” degree 
programs.  Finally, the strategy encourages consideration of off-duty education for 
promotion to E7 and mandates education points for completion of Associate degrees 
and Bachelor’s degrees for promotion to E6 and above.      
                                            
1 Garcia and Joy (1998) show that 60,793 (18% of the total enlisted force) participated in 1997 for total course 
registration of 139,772.  This represents about 2.3 courses per person, per year among participants.  However, the 
data from Garcia and Joy includes all participants in VOLED and overstates the TA participation rate. 
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Literature Review 
Garcia, Arkes and Trost (2002) were among the first to analyze the Navy’s 
VOLED program. The study analyzed the retention behavior of the 1992 cohort of Navy 
recruits who participated in any component of the VOLED program. To correct for the 
self-selection of sailors into the VOLED program, the authors used an instrumental 
variable that indicated whether sailors attended education counseling sessions. These 
sessions disseminated information on the VOLED program, and the authors 
hypothesized that better-informed sailors would be more likely to participate in VOLED. 
The estimates of the study suggest that VOLED participants have a probability of 
reenlistment that is 10.8 points above that of non-participants, or 12.9 points higher if 
factoring in self-selection. Buddin and Kapur (2002) argued that this instrument was 
most likely endogenous. The unobserved heterogeneity that drives sailors to participate 
in VOLED may be very similar to that which drives attendance in the information 
sessions. In addition, this study included in the control group individuals who left the 
Navy too early in their first term to participate in VOLED.  
Buddin and Kapur (2002) replicated the results of Garcia et al. but restricted the 
sample to those who remained in service for at least four years. They claimed that this 
restriction was necessary to ensure that all recruits in the control and treatment groups 
had an equal amount of time to participate in TA. Their replication analysis found that 
participating in TA reduced retention by about 9 percentage points. Buddin and Kapur 
attributed the positive retention effect found previously to the spurious correlation 
between TA usage and survival in the Navy. That is, estimates did not reflect the causal 
effect of TA participation increasing retention, but rather the reverse—those who survive 
all 4 years of their first enlistment term have more time to enroll in TA courses.  In this 
and in a related study, Buddin and Kapur (2005) provide new estimates of TA by using 
instrumental variables and propensity score matching to deal with the self-selection 
problem. The bivariate probit model treats TA usage as endogenous and includes 
instrumental variables (IVs) to predict TA usage. The IVs were based on the 
accessibility to college courses before enlistment and during service. In particular, the 
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study used distance from the sailors’ nearest 4-year college before enlistment, course 
offerings on base, base size, and an interaction of the last two variables to capture peer 
effects in college courses on base. Buddin and Kapur (2005) found that TA users had a 
lower retention rate (-16.5 percentage points) than non-users. Their propensity score 
estimates similarly indicated that the reenlistment probability of TA users was 7.5 points 
lower than that of non-TA users. The study concludes that TA users are more likely to 
leave the military for better job opportunities made possible by their increased education 
levels. 
While the Buddin and Kapur critique of prior research on TA and retention is 
valid, their results suffer from several weaknesses. First, like Garcia and Joy (1998) and 
Garcia et al. (2002), Buddin and Kapur limit themselves to data from a single cohort of 
Navy enlistees.  This raises questions about the external validity of the results of both 
studies.  External validity of estimated program effects refers to the extent to which the 
effects can be generalized to different populations or different time periods.  External 
validity may be questioned because the 1992 cohort may differ from the average cohort 
or from current entry cohort members.  In addition, the program itself has changed—it 
has expanded and reimbursement rates have increased.  Increase reimbursement rates 
and other changes in Navy policies on life-long learning have increased incentives for 
sailors to participate in TA. 
Some specific features of the 1992 cohort also raise questions of external 
validity. The FY1992 cohort enlisted a few months after the 1990-1991 recession, 
during which unemployment rates were as high as 7.5 percent. The initial 4-year 
contracts for this cohort expired during 1997-1998, which coincided with the dot-com 
boom and historically low unemployment rates of 4.5-4.7% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Employment Situation monthly news releases). This could also be the reason why the 
overall retention rate for this cohort is so low (about 30%). Enlistments tend to be high 
during economic downturns and retention tends to be low during economic booms. 
Therefore, part of the TA effect estimated with data from this special cohort may be due 
to external economic forces, rather than the program itself.  
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Second, while the instrument used by Garcia et al. (2002) (i.e., participation in 
VOLED information sessions) was potentially endogenous, the instruments used by the 
Buddin and Kapur are arguably weak and some of them may still be endogenous. The 
authors hypothesize that recruits who lived near a college before enlistment, have on 
net, a higher taste for college education.2 However, Card (1993), when using this IV, 
argues that the main reason proximity to college and college education are positively 
correlated is that those who live closer have lower costs associated with college 
education. In support of this argument, Card indicates that about 34% of college 
students live at home.3 The costs are not a part of the Buddin and Kapur argument 
when choosing this IV. However, they are relevant in the case at hand, since the reason 
some individuals join the military as a way to pay for college relates mostly to college 
costs rather than taste for education. In addition, for the exogeneity argument, one 
needs to investigate how taste for education interacts with taste for the military. The 
latter is most likely a strong predictor of retention. If, as argued by the authors, those 
who live closer to a college have higher tastes for education, the fact that they enlisted 
suggests they also have higher tastes for the military, and they would be more likely to 
stay in the military longer. Therefore, a priori it is unclear what the Buddin and Kapur 
“distance from college” IV is capturing, why it is correlated with TA use, and what is the 
relationship with retention. The other two IVs—course offerings on base and an 
interaction of base size and course availability—have a more intuitive relationship with 
TA use. The more courses available on base, the higher the probability of using TA. 
Similarly, the larger the number of recruits on base who take college courses, the more 
likely one is to participate in TA.  
A general problem with instrumental variable estimation is that the estimates may 
be biased if the partial correlation between the IVs and the endogenous variable is 
                                            
2 Buddin and Kapur (2002) claim that a subset of recruits may have had a lower taste for college 
education since they decided to enlist despite the proximity to a college. However, they argue that the net 
effect is that proximity to college before enlistment is positively correlated with taste for education.  
3 Card also points out that it is important to control for family background, since parents who live closer to 
a college may be more educated or because living at home makes a bigger difference for poorer 
students. In fact, in his data, 39% of African-American college-goers lived at home.  
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small. Hahn and Hausman (2002) argue that using instruments with little explanatory 
power yields estimates that are just as biased as OLS estimates. Even if instruments 
are significant and large samples are used, Steiger and Stock (1997) show that the 
instruments can still be weak if they jointly do not predict a considerable portion of the 
endogenous variable. The Buddin and Kapur (2002, 2005) studies do not report 
information on the partial correlation between TA use and the instruments. However, we 
believe that the IVs used do not explain much of the variation in TA participation.  The 
distance from nearest college, while partially significant, may only explain a small part of 
the decision to use TA. This finding is because the correlation of this IV with college 
education is muddled after condition on the decision to enlist. The empirical results 
indicate that course offerings on base do not explain a significant part of TA. Since 
recruits have some choice of where to live, they may choose to live in locations that 
facilitate taking college courses. Buddin and Kapur find that recruits living off-base are 
more likely to use TA, which is consistent with this argument.  
The instrumental variable measuring peer effects is original and statistically 
significant. However, adding this instrument to the other two increases the estimated 
partial effect of TA from -8.9 to -16.5 percentage points.4 One reason for this difference 
could be that the peer effects may not be entirely exogenous. If TA users are more likely 
to leave for better civilian opportunities, more such TA users on base may generate 
similar outcomes for an individual recruit and may reduce individual retention. Another 
reason may be that this is a symptom of weak IVs, and Hahn and Hausman (2002) 
show that the bias of IV estimates increases with the number of instruments. Finally, 
recent research shows that in non-linear models, interaction effects cannot be evaluated 
by looking at the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient. Ai and Norton (2003) 
point out that the interaction effect obtained after non-linear estimation may be positive 
for some observations and negative for others, and the same can be said about 
                                            
4 The Buddin and Kapur (2002) study did not include this IV. The comparison, therefore, is obtained from 
the 2002 and 2005 studies. The models appear very similar, the only difference being the way that course 
offerings are measured. In the 2002 study, the authors controlled for the number of schools at base, 
whereas in the 2005 study they measure the number of courses offered. With the exception of the TA 
effect, all other partial effects are close across these two models.  
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statistical significance. Therefore, it is not clear whether this instrument should be used, 
given the methodological issues—concerns about its exogeneity—and the large impact 
it has on the estimated TA effect. 
The propensity score estimates depend on the same assumption as OLS 
estimates, namely that all selection into the program depends on observable 
characteristics. In the case of TA use, we are mostly concerned about the unobservable 
factors that drive some recruits to participate in TA. The propensity score estimates, 
however, compare more similar individuals than OLS estimates, and may include less 
bias. Overall, what seems to drive the main differences between the Garcia and Joy 
(1998) and Garcia et al. (2002) findings and those generated by Buddin and Kapur 
(2002, 2005), are not the estimation methods but the sample restrictions. When 
replicating the Garcia et al. findings with the same data, Buddin and Kapur obtain a 
negative retention effect on TA after restricting the sample to those who complete 4 
years in service.  
We could argue that the Garcia et al. and Buddin and Kapur studies are 
analyzing different questions, depending on whether they assume that participation and 
separation are joint decisions. If we assume that participation and separation are joint 
decisions, separation would be defined broadly to include any type of separation, 
including early attrition as well as non-reenlistment of first-term survivors. An alternative 
view is that early attrition and non-reenlistment reflect distinctly different behavior. 
Attrition represents a decision to leave/be discharged before termination of a legal 
contract, whereas non-reenlistment is generally a voluntary career decision by the 
individual. In principle, attriters are discharged due to a failure to complete required 
training or to adapt to the demands of military life or due to pre-service background 
characteristics that were not revealed during the recruitment process (e.g., drug use or 
criminal behavior). Moreover, most attrition occurs early in a sailor’s career, often during 
the first few months. Hence, much attrition is non-voluntary, and the portion that is 
voluntary is due to maladjustment to military life. In addition, during this early period the 
individual is occupied with the demands of passing initial required training and has little 
time available to enroll in college classes.  
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Buddin and Kapur assume that the attrition-participation-reenlistment process is 
sequential; consequently, they drop attriters from their analysis samples. Garcia et al. 
(2002), on the other hand, assume that these are joint decisions, which supports 
keeping attriters in their analysis samples. Of course, it is an open question as to when 
the participation and retention decisions should be viewed as joint decisions. It is likely 
that prior to a given career point, attrition is not endogenous with participation, whereas 
beyond that point it may become endogenous. Garcia et al. (2002) implicitly assume 
that the decision is always made jointly during the first term of service, whereas Buddin 
and Kapur assume it is made jointly only during the last 2 years of the first term. Even 
so, removing individuals who leave early may cause a bias in the opposite direction 
since TA use may have a “lock-in” effect—those who want to benefit from the TA 
program must remain in the military to do so. We follow Buddin and Kapur and assume 
that attrition and reenlistment reflect inherently different behavior; accordingly, we 
restrict our sample to those who remain in service for at least 3 years. We also test how 
important this restriction is for our results by re-estimating the TA effects without 
imposing this sample restriction.  
Most recently, Flaherty (2007) analyzed the effect of tuition reimbursement on 
employee retention in a non-profit organization. The institution implemented a tuition-
reimbursement program in September 1999.  The study contained snapshots of data 
from years 1999-2005, including information on demographics, wages, and date of hire. 
About 4.5% of the employees participated in the tuition assistance program. Flaherty 
found that employees who participated in the program were less likely to leave 
compared to employees who did not participate. She also found that the program 
effects varied largely among workers hired before 1999 and those hired after the 
implementation of the program. Flaherty attributes the positive retention result to 
complementarities between general and specific human capital, which lead to higher 
pay and better career possibilities within the firm, thus reducing turnover.  
Methodologically, Flaherty (2007) follows Garcia et al. (2002) and Buddin and 
Kapur (2005). She restricts her sample to those who do not attrite within the first year 
(due to data issues), and she obtains bivariate probit estimates employing an IV similar 
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to the peer-effect variable used by Buddin and Kapur. More specifically, the instrument 
captures the participation rate of peers in the tuition reimbursement program (excluding 
the individual from these calculations). The peers are defined as employees in the same 
division (out of 18 divisions) and job classification (i.e., administrative, professional, 
researcher, or manager).  
Flaherty’s simple probit estimates suggest that participation in the tuition 
reimbursement program reduces the probability of separating within 5 years by 22 and 
24 percentage points, depending on whether the employee was hired before 1999 or 
during 1999-2001. The bivariate probit estimates are insignificant for the sample of 
employees hired before 1999, but they inflate to 52 percentage points for the sample of 
new hires. When focusing on the degree that employees are pursuing (i.e., 
undergraduate or graduate) the partial effects increase to 42 and 58 percentage points 
for the two groups, respectively.  
The main issue with Flaherty’s findings is that the predicted marginal effects are 
implausibly large; they range from 50% to 100% reduction in turnover rates. The 
estimated magnitude of the effect is especially large for the group of new hires. It could 
be that the tuition assistance program may have changed the ability composition of the 
new hires. At the very least, the bivariate probit results indicate that these two groups 
are different in unobserved characteristics. In particular, the correlation between errors 
in the participation and retention equations always appears positive and large (between 
49-81%, although often insignificant) for the group of new hires, whereas for the pre-
1999 hires, it is negative or insignificant (ranging from -44% to -50%). If the instrument 
used is weak, then this might explain the large estimate on the partial effect of the 
program.  
In fact, as argued earlier, peer effects in participation may even be endogenous. 
Indeed, the more people in the peer group participate in the program, the more likely it 
is that the individual will do so, provided that participant peers proxy for information 
about the program. However, there is no reason to believe that peer effects are 
confined to the participation decision. In fact, it could be argued that if more peers leave 
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the organization, it is more likely the individual will do so as well, perhaps due to 
improved information on external employment opportunities. If the overall participation 
rate in the tuition reimbursement program and retention are correlated within the firm, 
the more likely it is that peer participation rates and individual retention are also 
correlated, and the instrument is endogenous.  
Little is known about the hierarchical structure of the organization in this study. 
However, if this organization is similar to other firms in which promotions are determined 
by local tournaments of employees for limited promotion slots, then the higher the 
proportion of peers that obtain general education, the less likely it is that the individual 
will be promoted. The main argument of the paper is that general education improves 
internal career progression of individuals, which is the reason they are more likely to 
stay. This implies a correlation between promotion probability and retention. In addition, 
the peer group consists of workers in similar positions within the firm who are more 
likely to compete with each other for promotions. Therefore, the peer participation rate 
may be correlated with program participation via increased information and also 
correlated with retention via increased competition for promotions. Assuming a 
hierarchical structure and internal competition for promotions makes the instrument 
potentially endogenous. A final issue with the estimates is the small sample of 
participants—only 385, of which only 132 represent new hires. In contrast, non-
participants total 5,621 hired before 1999, and 2,361 hired after 1999. Instrumental 
variable estimations are consistent but biased in small samples.  
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Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This section discusses the data used for the analysis and provides descriptive 
statistics.  The analysis uses data obtained from three sources: the Military Entrance 
Processing Command (MEPCOM), Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), and the 
Center for Personal and Professional Development (CPPD) under the Naval Personnel 
Development Command (NPDC). The merged data set provides information on each 
sailor’s career progression, background characteristics, and course enrollments under 
the Tuition Assistance (TA) program.  The data consists of 8 cohorts who entered the 
Navy between 1994 and 2001.  Each cohort is followed through the first 5 years of 
service to determine whether the recruits separate before completing their first term, 
whether they complete their first term of service, and whether they reenlist or extend.    
The analysis focuses on the effect of TA on sailors’ promotion and retention 
outcomes.  We focus on the first term of enlistment for two reasons. First, the probability 
of remaining in the military for a career increases substantially for those who 
successfully complete their first enlistment term and reenlist. As we discussed above, 
those who remain in the military beyond their first term may have different goals from 
those who leave after the first term, and therefore, the effects of the TA program may be 
affected by this selection. Second, we aim to provide estimates that are comparable to 
prior studies, which focus exclusively on the first term of service.   
The MEPCOM data provides demographic characteristics of Navy enlistees at 
the time of accession, including race and ethnicity, marital status and number of 
dependents, education, gender, Armed Forces Qualification Test score (AFQT), and 
length of initial contract.  The DMDC data provides annual information on individuals 
during their first 5 years of service, including career progression and promotion, 
separation, and reenlistment.   The sample was restricted in several ways.  Only service 
members with 4-year obligations (enlistment contracts) were included in our sample 
(called 4YO’s).  Because 5- and 6-year obligors typically have much longer training 
pipelines, this restriction assures a more homogenous sample.  In addition, following 
Buddin and Kapur , the sample enlistees who failed to complete their first term of 
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service were deleted.  Sailors who left the Navy early during their first term would not 
have had the same opportunity to use TA as those who completed their obligations. 
Finally, sailors with prior service were excluded from the sample since they may have 
systematic differences in tastes for the military and for further education and may enter 
at higher grades. 
The CPPD data provide information on all course enrollments in the TA program 
by active duty enlisted personnel between 1994 and 2006. The file contains information 
on courses taken, course grades, authorized funding, cost of courses, and type of 
course (i.e., high school or GED, undergraduate, graduate).  Our analysis sample is 
restricted to service members who used TA for undergraduate college courses.  We 
remove from the sample all sailors taking high school courses, GED-prep classes, 
remedial classes, or graduate courses.  
Variable Descriptions 
This study measures the effect of TA usage on two career outcomes: retention 
and promotion.  We base retention on enlistees staying in the Navy beyond their initial 
4-year obligation (first reenlistment opportunity). We examine two promotion outcomes: 
the first indicator captures promotion to E4 (petty officer third class) before the end of 
the first term of service; the second indicator captures promotion to E5, which is a fairly 
rare event and signals a superior performer.  Table 5 provides variable descriptions. 
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Table 5.   Variable Descriptions  
(Tabulated from MEPCOM, DMDC, and NPDC data) 
VARIABLE DEMOGRAPHICS DESCRIPTION 
Female =1 if female, =0 otherwise 
White =1 if Caucasian, =0 otherwise 
Black =1 if African American, = 0 otherwise 
Hispanic =1 if Hispanic, = 0 otherwise 
Native =1 if Native American, = 0 otherwise 
Asian =1 if Asian or Pacific Islander, = 0 otherwise 
Other =1 if race none of above, = 0 otherwise 
CAT I =1 if AFQT score 93-99, = 0 otherwise 
CAT II =1 if AFQT score 65-92, = 0 otherwise 
CAT IIIA =1 if AFQT score 50-64, = 0 otherwise 
CAT IIIB , = 0 otherwise =1 if AFQT score 31-49 
HS Dropout =1 if no high school diploma at accession, = 0 otherwise 
High School Diploma =1 if high school diploma at accession, = 0 otherwise 
Some College =1 if college credits at accession, = 0 otherwise 
College Degree =1 if college degree at accession, = 0 otherwise 
Married Marital status 3rd year in service  
(1=married, 0 otherwise) 
Dependents Dependents in 3rd year of service (1=dependent[s], 0 otherwise) 
1994-2001 Dichotomous variables for accession year  
(1=accessed that year, 0 otherwise) 
 
CAREER INFORMATION 
TIS Time in service (in months).  Calculated by subtracting Date of 
Separation (DOS) from Base Active Service Date (BASD).  If no 
DOS info, September 30, 2006 used to calculate. 
Pay grade Categorical variable equivalent to numeric pay grade. Calculated for 
each FY. 
Rating Dichotomous variables for each Navy enlisted rating 
TUITION ASSISTANCE 
Any TA Used =1 if used TA for at least 1 college course, 0 otherwise 
Passed Course =1 if completed college course using TA, 0 otherwise 
FY Dummy variables for fiscal year course taken 
The multivariate models below use the following variables: race, gender, 
education, AFQT scores, marital status, and dependents.  The reenlistment variable 
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was based on time in service (in months), which was estimated by subtracting date of 
separation (DOS) from Base Active Service Date (BASD).  Sailors with no date of 
separation records were assumed to be on active duty. For them, the time in service 
was calculated by subtracting the date of enlistment from September 30, 2006, which is 
the last date of observation in the study.    
Samples and Descriptive Statistics 
The original sample was restricted to sailors who are 4YO’s and who have no 
prior service.  After applying the sample restrictions, we were left with 331,920 
observations of active duty enlisted accessions. Annual accessions averaged about 
34,000 during the 1994-1996 period, but they rose to an annual average of about 
45,000 between 1997 and 2001. 
Descriptive Statistics 
After removing sailors who attrite during the first 36 months in service, 
observations on 217,872 sailors remained. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics on this 
sample.  The TA participation rate in this sample was .22, which is based on the rate for 
all 8 accession cohorts during their 5-year service period. The sample consists of 17% 
women, 19% African-American, and 11.6% Hispanic.  Most new recruits entered with at 
least a high school diploma (92%) and with a mean AFQT score of 61.2.  Table 6 
reveals that the reenlistment rate of TA users exceeds that of non-users by 12 points 
(about 20%).  In addition, the promotion rate to E4 and E5 was 3.6 points and 5.4 points 
higher, respectively, for TA users. 
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Table 6.   Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample 





TA Usage Rate .226 -- -- 
TA Completers .177 .781 -- 
Reenlist Rate .595 .679 .570 
Promote Rate 
E4+ 
.562 .590 .554 
Promote Rate E5 .160 .202 .148 
AFQT Score (%) 61.20 62.5 60.83 
Female .170 .318 .127 
Married .239 .253 .234 
White .604 .547 .620 
African-American .190 .214 .182 
Hispanic .116 .137 .110 
Asian .054 .065 .050 
H.S. Diploma .890 .908 .884 
Some College .008 .008 .007 
No Diploma/ 
GED 
.088 .072 .094 
Sample Size 217,872 49,414 168,458 
 
Of the 217,872 new recruits in the sample 49,426, or 22%, used TA at some time 
during their first term of service (for all entrants, including early leavers, the TA usage 
rate was only 15%). Of all TA users, 38,786, or 78%, successfully completed at least 
one course.  Thus, 10,640, or 21.5%, received tuition assistance but did not complete 
the class (either withdrew or failed).  Women used TA at twice the rate of men (27% vs. 
12%).  Women also had higher successful course completion rates than men (81% vs. 
77%).  Among racial/ethnic groups, Asians had the highest percentage of successful 
completion (81%) while Native Americans had the lowest (75%).  Sailors, with some 
college education, had higher TA usage rates (22%) than high school dropouts (8%), 
GEDs (10%), and college degree holders (10%). Sailors with higher entry-level 
education had more success in completing courses: those with some college education 
had successful completion rates of 85% versus about 72% for high school dropouts and 
GED holders.  
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To adjust for selection, the same models that are run on the full sample are run 
on the sample restricted to only TA users. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for this 
sample in column 1, for TA completers only in column 2 and for non-completers in 
column 3.  Table 7 shows that course completers in column 2 have higher reenlistment 
rates and promotion rates than non-completers in column 3.  In addition, completers 
have slightly higher AFQT scores and are more likely to be female.  On the other hand, 
completers are less likely to be black or not have a regular high school diploma. 
Table 7.   Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of TA Users Only 






TA Usage Rate -- -- -- 
TA Completers .781 -- -- 
Reenlist Rate .679 .691 .634 
Promote Rate 
E4+ 
.590 .598 .562 
Promote Rate E5 .202 .212 .165 
AFQT Score (%) 62.5 63.06 60.71 
Female .318 .330 .278 
Married .253 .254 .252 
White .547 .549 .541 
African-American .214 .210 .231 
Hispanic .137 .138 .134 
Asian .065 .067 .056 
H.S. Diploma .908 .912 .894 
Some College .008 .020 .012 
No Diploma/ 
GED 
.072 .066 .092 
Sample Size 49,414 38,779 10,635 
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Model Estimates 
We first estimated a multivariate model of the determinants of TA program 
participation using the full sample of entry cohorts. We then estimate multivariate 
models of reenlistment.  All models are estimated via non-linear maximum likelihood 
techniques, using the assumption of normally distributed errors (i.e., the probit model).  
For the baseline reenlistment model the sample is restricted to include only those who 
survive the first 36 months of service. To highlight the importance of this assumption, in 
our sample TA participation rates are 6% for early attriters versus 22% for those who 
survive at least 36 months. This clearly supports the assumption that those who attrite 
early have fewer opportunities to make use of the TA program and are not comparable 
to those who complete their first term of service. We also estimate probit models of 
promotion outcomes.  The sample for the baseline promotion models, to both E4 and to 
E5, is restricted to those who survive the first 12 months of service.  Since promotion to 
E4 can occur as early as 1 year of service, for the promotion probit models we delete 
from the sample those who do not survive at least 1 year.  This group had no 
opportunity to receive a promotion to E4 or E5.  These restrictions eliminate a source of 
potential bias by excluding those who attrite prior to being reenlistment-eligible or 
promotion-eligible (i.e., those who had no opportunity to make a reenlistment decision 
or to be considered for promotion).   
The first model analyzes the determinants of participation in the TA program 
during the first 4 years of service.  This model investigates whether the differences in 
TA usage rates across gender and race categories can be explained by observed 
characteristics, such as educational attainment prior to enlistment or ability. Next, we 
estimate a reenlistment model in which the variables of interest are the indicator of TA 
usage and the indicator of successful completion of college courses. In these models, 
the dependent variable measures whether individual sailors reenlist or extends at their 
first decision point (the fourth year of service). Finally, we estimate the probability of 
achieving the rank of E-4 and E-5 by the fourth year of service. These models include 
as control variables race/ethnicity, gender, education, AFQT scores, marital status and 
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dependents. In addition, all models include fiscal year dummies and rating dummies 
(coefficients not reported). .  
Determinants of Tuition Assistance Program Participation 
Table 8 provides the results of the baseline TA participation probit model. 
Estimated coefficients are presented in column 1, with standard errors in parentheses 
and marginal effects (estimated via the delta method) in column 2.  One noteworthy 
result in Table 8 is that participation rates for women are 18 percentage points higher 
(nearly double) than those of men.  In addition, most minorities, except Native 
Americans, are more likely to use TA than whites. The difference is the largest for 
Hispanics, who are 7 points (about 30%) more likely to participate than whites. A 
possible explanation for this difference may be that the reasons for enlistment vary 
systematically across gender and race categories. Minorities may view military service 
as a vehicle for social advancement, and they have a higher propensity for using 
military benefits. They also may be less likely to afford postsecondary education, due to 
their potential disadvantaged socioeconomic status. Results in Table 8 also indicate that 
time constraints may be important in determining TA use. Individuals who are married at 
entry and do not have children tend to use TA at a higher rate than single sailors, 
whereas those with children (single or married) are less likely to use TA. Ability also 
plays a role. Compared to CAT II recruits, those in lower mental categories are less 
likely to use TA. Across educational categories, the only sailors who are more likely to 
use TA than high school graduates are those with some college education.  Non-
diploma graduates and GED holders are less likely to participate in TA (compared to 
high school diploma graduates).  Finally, the fiscal year dummies indicate that TA 
participation has increased over time.  This increase could be in response to the policy 
that increased the reimbursement rate in 2002. 
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Table 8.   Probit Model of Tuition Assistance Participation (includes completed 
and non-completed courses) 
 Dependent variable: Participate in TA 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient  
(standard error) 
Marginal Effect 
Female 0.610 0.180 
 (0.007)***  
Black 0.172 0.045 
 (0.008)***  
Hispanic 0.262 0.072 
 (0.009)***  
Native -0.069 -0.017 
 (0.019)***  
Asian 0.322 0.091 
 (0.013)***  
Other 0.256 0.072 
 (0.029)***  
age2 0.018 0.004 
 (0.001)***  
sing_kid -0.183 -0.042 
 (0.015)***  
marr_nk 0.160 0.043 
 (0.079)**  
marr_kid -0.020 -0.005 
 (0.014)  
tier_i -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.013)  
tier_iiia -0.102 -0.025 
 (0.007)***  
tier_iiib -0.306 -0.072 
 (0.007)***  
tier_iv -0.451 -0.088 
 (0.149)***  
tier_unk -0.202 -0.045 
 (0.069)***  
Non_high_sch_grad -0.292 -0.063 
 (0.018)***  
GED -0.185 -0.042 
 (0.012)***  
some_college 0.068 0.018 
 (0.032)**  
college_degree -0.484 -0.094 
 (0.029)***  
fy95 -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.013)  
fy96 -0.013 -0.003 
 (0.013)  
fy97 0.027 0.007 
 (0.012)**  
fy98 0.148 0.039 
 (0.012)***  
fy99 0.174 0.046 
 (0.012)***  
fy00 0.203 0.054 
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 (0.012)***  
fy01 0.225 0.060 
 (0.012)***  
Constant -1.462  
 (0.025)***  
Observations 276912 276912 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
These results mirror those in Buddin and Kapur (2005), who also find 
participation rates to be much higher for women (70% higher) and for Hispanics (20% 
higher) compared to white males. One difference in results between the two studies is 
that they find that both married sailors and those with children are less likely to use TA 
as compared to single sailors.   
Reenlistment Models 
The reenlistment models estimate the effect of TA use on the probability of 
reenlistment while controlling for race/ethnicity, gender, education, AFQT scores, 
marital status, number of dependents, and year dummies. Dummy variables for each 
Navy enlisted occupation (rating) are included in the models to control for economic and 
other unobserved factors associated with each rating that affect reenlistment decisions.  
Since ratings represent various occupational categories, civilian job opportunities may 
vary by rating and this may affect reenlistment decisions. Also, promotions in the Navy 
are based on vacancies in each rating, so ratings with low retention tend to have higher 
promotion rates and better opportunities for career advancement.  In addition, ratings 
with historically low retention are normally offered higher selective reenlistment bonuses 
(SRB), which also affect retention behavior.   
The results of the probit reenlistment model are presented in Table 9.  The 
baseline model restricts the sample to new recruits who survive at least 36 months. The 
estimates are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9. They indicate that those who 
use TA are 12.1 points (about 20%) more likely to reenlist. Females are 4.9 points less 
likely to reenlist than males, whereas minorities are more likely to reenlist than whites. 
Being married or having dependents (in the third year of service) increases the 
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probability of reenlistment. High school graduates are more likely to reenlist than those 
with any other education level at accession.   
Table 9.   Probit Reenlistment Model  
 Dependent Variable: Reenlist 
 FULL 
SAMPLE 
 TA USERS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Any TA Used 0.321 0.121 — — 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)***   
Passed course — — 0.171 0.062 
   (0.015)*** (0.005)*** 
Female -0.125 -0.049 -0.121 -0.044 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.013)*** (0.005)*** 
Black 0.261 0.099 0.256 0.088 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.017)*** (0.005)*** 
Hispanic 0.054 0.021 0.089 0.031 
 (0.009)*** (0.004)*** (0.018)*** (0.006)*** 
Native American 0.039 0.015 0.069 0.024 
 (0.018)** (0.007)** (0.041)* (0.014)* 
Asian 0.319 0.119 0.269 0.090 
 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.026)*** (0.008)*** 
Other Race 0.066 0.025 0.079 0.027 
 (0.030)** (0.011)** (0.057) (0.019) 
Married 0.087 0.034 0.043 0.015 
 (0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.020)** (0.007)** 
Dependents 0.123 0.047 0.132 0.046 
 (0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.021)*** (0.007)*** 
Age 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
CAT I 0.305 0.114 0.124 0.043 
 (0.014)*** (0.005)*** (0.028)*** (0.010)*** 
CAT IIIA -0.256 -0.100 -0.090 -0.032 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.015)*** (0.006)*** 
CAT IIIB -0.291 -0.114 -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.016) (0.006) 
CAT IV 0.065 0.025 0.313 0.102 
 (0.138) (0.053) (0.375) (0.109) 
CAT UNKNOWN -0.183 -0.072 -0.216 -0.080 
 (0.073)** (0.029)** (0.143) (0.055) 
High School Dropout -0.074 -0.029 0.037 0.013 
 (0.017)*** (0.007)*** (0.042) (0.015) 
GED -0.067 -0.026 0.028 0.010 
 (0.012)*** (0.005)*** (0.028) (0.010) 
Some College 0.013 0.005 -0.108 -0.039 
 (0.033) (0.013) (0.060)* (0.022)* 
College Degree -0.172 -0.068 -0.205 -0.076 
 (0.026)*** (0.011)*** (0.067)*** (0.026)*** 
fy95 -0.085 -0.033 -0.107 -0.039 
 (0.012)*** (0.005)*** (0.027)*** (0.010)*** 
fy96 0.049 0.019 0.028 0.010 
 (0.012)*** (0.005)*** (0.027) (0.010) 
fy97 0.194 0.074 0.223 0.076 
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 (0.012)*** (0.004)*** (0.027)*** (0.009)*** 
fy98 0.303 0.114 0.316 0.105 
 (0.012)*** (0.004)*** (0.026)*** (0.008)*** 
fy99 0.246 0.093 0.276 0.093 
 (0.012)*** (0.004)*** (0.025)*** (0.008)*** 
fy00 0.151 0.058 0.216 0.074 
 (0.012)*** (0.004)*** (0.025)*** (0.008)*** 
fy01 0.023 0.009 0.046 0.016 
 (0.011)** (0.004)** (0.024)* (0.008)* 
Constant -0.092  -0.053  
 (0.025)***  (0.053)  
Observations 206,427 206,427 48,823 48,823 
Notes: Sample includes only sailors who stayed in service for at least 36 months. 
All models include rating dummies. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
To assess the importance of the assumption about the endogeneity of the 
separation and participation decisions, we also estimated the baseline reenlistment 
model using a sample consisting of all new recruits. The approach follows Garcia and 
Joy (1998). The reenlistment model using this unrestricted sample is displayed in 
Appendix Table A.  The estimated partial effect of TA in Appendix Table A is .264, 
which is much larger than the partial effect of .12 in Table 9, when the sample is 
restricted to only those who stay in the Navy for at least 36 months.  The effect 
estimated from the full sample overstates the true program effect because the 
comparison group includes sailors who left the Navy early and therefore did not have 
the same opportunity to participate in TA as did the survivors.  This finding reinforces 
the issue noted previously in the literature review: inclusion in the sample of sailors who 
do not have an equal opportunity to use TA will cause an upward bias in the estimated 
program effect. The 14-point difference in the estimated reenlistment effect of TA 
(between Appendix Table A and Table 9) represents the bias for failing to restrict the 
sample to non-attriters.   
While the identification of the correct treatment and control groups is an 
important question in the research design, self-selection represents an equally 
important issue.  The estimates of the TA effect in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 may be 
biased because participants are not likely to be randomly selected. Sailors who choose 
to participate in TA may be more motivated or have higher ability compared to sailors 
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who do not take any college courses. Furthermore, these characteristics are likely to be 
correlated with job performance and the probability of reenlistment.  
To correct the estimates for self-selection, we exploit the fact that not all 
participants complete the courses in which they enroll. We assume that all participants 
who use TA to enroll in college courses share similar motivation, initiative, and aptitude, 
but some are unable to complete the courses for exogenous reasons. Such reasons are 
often related to military deployments and other job duties that are beyond the 
individual’s control. Hence, we assume that the external forces that prevent sailors from 
completing their courses are exogenous, in that they are correlated with course 
completion but not with reenlistment or promotion. We use this exogenous variation 
among TA participants to estimate the program effect. The approach is to use a sample 
consisting solely of TA users and to compare successful course completers with 
enrollees who do not complete their courses. This way, the effect of TA represents the 
effect of increased education levels on performance and career advancement. The 
results of this estimation are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9. 
The estimated marginal effect of successful completion of TA courses is 6.2 
percentage points in this model.  Since the overall reenlistment rate in this sample is 
.68, this represents an increase in reenlistment rates of about 9%.  This effect is much 
smaller than the 20% marginal effect of TA estimated with the entire sample of sailors in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 9. As expected, the former estimates may have included an 
upward bias due to the higher ability and motivation of TA course taker.   
Promotion Models 
Next we investigate the effect of TA use on the promotion probability. Table 10 
provides a comparison of pay grade distributions at the end of 4 years of service for TA 
users and non-users.  Relative to sailors who did not use TA, those who used TA had a 
lower representation in pay grades E1-E3, and a higher representation in grades E4 
and E5.  Thus, it appears that TA users were more likely to be promoted than other 
sailors. 
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Table 10.   Distribution by Pay Grade and TA Usage at the End of the Fourth 
Year (TIS greater than 12 months),  
(Tabulated from DMDC and NPDC data)  
Pay grade TA Users Non-TA Users 
4th Year Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
E1        65  0%   1,481  0.9% 
E2      194  0%   1,848  1.1% 
E3   7,913 17% 29,136 17.5% 
E4 29,187 61% 94,334 56.5% 
E5 10,001 21% 24,971 15.0% 
E6+       25  0%      522  0.3% 
Total 47,503 100% 166,833 100.0% 
 
To investigate whether these differences are causal in nature, we estimate probit 
models of promotion probability as a function of TA use and other observable controls. 
In Table 11 we present estimates of the probability of promotion to E-4 or higher during 
the first term. In columns 1 and 2 we restrict the sample to those who survive at least 1 
year of service. The results show that TA participation increases the probability of 
promotion to E-4 by 14.1 percentage points (about 23%). It is noteworthy to observe 
that women and African-Americans appear less likely to promote to E-4 during the first 
term. Later we investigate whether being a minority and participating in TA mitigates this 
effect.  
Again, there is some concern that the estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 
are biased upward because unobserved characteristics that affect TA participation are 
also likely to be correlated with promotion.  In columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 we restrict 
the sample to TA participants and investigate the effect of more general education on 
the probability of promoting to E-4. It should be noted that this promotion is highly 
dependent on performance, hence the results are likely to indicate the effect of 
education on productivity.  The estimates indicate that course completers have a 
promotion rate only 3 points (about 5%) above that of non-completers. This estimate is 
significantly smaller than the estimate obtained by comparing TA participants to non-
participants, suggesting that the previous results included an upward bias.  In columns 1 
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and 2, the coefficient on gender is no longer significant, which suggests that the gender 
differences in promotion rates may be due to unobserved ability and motivation (which 
are more likely to be held constant in the restricted sample).   
Table 11.   Probit E4 Promotion Models (Include Rating Specific Dummies) 
 Dependent Variable: Promote to E4 
 FULL SAMPLE  TA USERS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Any TA Used 0.357 0.141 — — 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)***   
Passed course — — 0.078 0.030 
   (0.014)*** (0.006)*** 
Female -0.109 -0.043 0.011 0.004 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.013) (0.005) 
Black -0.061 -0.024 -0.040 -0.016 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.016)** (0.006)** 
Hispanic 0.069 0.028 0.011 0.004 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.018) (0.007) 
Native American -0.044 -0.018 -0.028 -0.011 
 (0.016)*** (0.006)*** (0.039) (0.015) 
Asian 0.198 0.079 0.030 0.012 
 (0.012)*** (0.005)*** (0.024) (0.009) 
Other race 0.033 0.013 0.055 0.021 
 (0.027) (0.011) (0.055) (0.021) 
Age -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.002) (0.001) 
Single, with kids -0.023 -0.009 0.047 0.018 
 (0.013)* (0.005)* (0.032) (0.012) 
Married, no kids 0.032 0.013 0.054 0.021 
 (0.075) (0.030) (0.143) (0.055) 
Married with kids 0.012 0.005 -0.049 -0.019 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.028)* (0.011)* 
CAT I -0.400 -0.155 -0.433 -0.171 
 (0.012)*** (0.004)*** (0.027)*** (0.010)*** 
CAT IIIA -0.038 -0.015 -0.026 -0.010 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.015)* (0.006)* 
CAT IIIB -0.095 -0.038 -0.069 -0.027 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.016)*** (0.006)*** 
CAT IV -0.116 -0.046 0.235 0.088 
 (0.118) (0.046) (0.349) (0.125) 
CAT unknown -0.374 -0.145 -0.141 -0.056 
 (0.065)*** (0.024)*** (0.142) (0.056) 
High school  -0.224 -0.088 -0.039 -0.015 
dropout (0.015)*** (0.006)*** (0.040) (0.016) 
GED -0.227 -0.089 -0.027 -0.011 
 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** (0.027) (0.010) 
Some college 0.034 0.013 -0.063 -0.025 
 (0.030) (0.012) (0.059) (0.023) 
College_degree -0.094 -0.038 -0.121 -0.048 
 (0.024)*** (0.009)*** (0.065)* (0.026)* 
fy95 0.049 0.020 0.070 0.027 
 (0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.027)** (0.010)*** 
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fy96 0.214 0.085 0.233 0.088 
 (0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.027)*** (0.010)*** 
fy97 0.210 0.084 0.150 0.057 
 (0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.026)*** (0.010)*** 
fy98 0.171 0.068 0.047 0.018 
 (0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.025)* (0.010)* 
fy99 0.152 0.061 0.057 0.022 
 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** (0.024)** (0.009)** 
fy00 0.046 0.018 -0.091 -0.035 
 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** (0.024)*** (0.009)*** 
fy01 0.028 0.011 -0.041 -0.016 
 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** (0.024)* (0.009)* 
Constant 0.008  0.289  
 (0.023)  (0.052)***  
Observations 249,357 249,357 48,850 48,850 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Next we turn to the effect of TA use on E-5 promotion. Table 12 displays probit 
models of promotion to E-5 for both the restricted (TA users only) and the unrestricted 
samples. While TA users are 6.1 points (30%) more likely to attain E-5 according to 
estimates in columns 1 and 2, in the selection-adjusted estimates in columns 3 and 4 
the marginal effect falls to 4.9 points (a 25% difference). Women and minorities are less 
likely to promote to E-5, all else equal, whether the sample is restricted to TA users or 
not.  
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Table 12.   Probit Regression Estimates of Promotion to E-5 (Models Include 
Rating Specific Dummies) 
 Dependent variable: Promote to E5 
 FULL SAMPLE  TA USERS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Any TA Used 0.301 0.061 — — 
 (0.008)*** (0.002)***   
Passed course — — 0.211 0.049 
   (0.018)*** (0.004)*** 
Female -0.235 -0.039 -0.208 -0.050 
 (0.010)*** (0.001)*** (0.016)*** (0.004)*** 
Black -0.241 -0.040 -0.209 -0.049 
 (0.011)*** (0.002)*** (0.020)*** (0.004)*** 
Hispanic -0.101 -0.017 -0.123 -0.029 
 (0.011)*** (0.002)*** (0.022)*** (0.005)*** 
Native American -0.031 -0.005 -0.026 -0.006 
 (0.020) (0.004) (0.044) (0.011) 
Asian -0.088 -0.015 -0.156 -0.036 
 (0.016)*** (0.003)*** (0.030)*** (0.007)*** 
Other race -0.168 -0.028 -0.256 -0.056 
 (0.037)*** (0.005)*** (0.068)*** (0.013)*** 
Age 0.037 0.007 0.028 0.007 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** 
Single, with kids 0.004 0.001 0.061 0.016 
 (0.018) (0.003) (0.038) (0.010) 
Married, no kids 0.196 0.040 0.221 0.061 
 (0.090)** (0.021)* (0.157) (0.047) 
Married with kids 0.153 0.030 0.182 0.049 
 (0.015)*** (0.003)*** (0.031)*** (0.009)*** 
CAT I 0.624 0.155 0.622 0.193 
 (0.012)*** (0.004)*** (0.027)*** (0.010)*** 
CAT IIIA -0.405 -0.065 -0.393 -0.089 
 (0.009)*** (0.001)*** (0.018)*** (0.004)*** 
CAT IIIB -0.783 -0.120 -0.639 -0.136 
 (0.010)*** (0.001)*** (0.021)*** (0.004)*** 
CAT IV 0.076 0.015 -0.050 -0.012 
 (0.071) (0.014) (0.158) (0.037) 
CAT unknown -0.275 -0.042 -0.126 -0.029 
 (0.021)*** (0.003)*** (0.048)*** (0.011)*** 
High school  -0.218 -0.035 -0.126 -0.030 
dropout (0.014)*** (0.002)*** (0.031)*** (0.007)*** 
GED 0.234 0.049 0.183 0.050 
 (0.034)*** (0.008)*** (0.064)*** (0.019)*** 
College degree 0.425 0.098 0.293 0.083 
 (0.025)*** (0.007)*** (0.070)*** (0.022)*** 
fy95 0.046 0.009 0.114 0.030 
 (0.018)** (0.003)** (0.041)*** (0.011)*** 
fy96 0.170 0.034 0.238 0.065 
 (0.017)*** (0.004)*** (0.039)*** (0.011)*** 
fy97 0.485 0.109 0.622 0.189 
 (0.016)*** (0.004)*** (0.036)*** (0.012)*** 
fy98 0.780 0.196 0.928 0.297 
 (0.015)*** (0.005)*** (0.034)*** (0.013)*** 
fy99 0.750 0.185 0.877 0.275 
 (0.015)*** (0.005)*** (0.034)*** (0.012)*** 
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fy00 0.765 0.189 0.957 0.303 
 (0.015)*** (0.005)*** (0.034)*** (0.012)*** 
fy01 0.685 0.164 0.872 0.270 
 (0.015)*** (0.004)*** (0.033)*** (0.012)*** 
Constant -2.170  -2.123  
 (0.030)***  (0.064)***  
Observations 249357 249357 48845 48845 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
Gender and Race Interactions 
Because enrollment appears to vary systematically with race and gender, we 
next investigate differences in the impact of TA for minorities and women. Table 13 
presents findings for African-Americans. Panel A uses the entire sample and compares 
TA-participants with non-participants in respect to reenlistment rates and promotion to 
E4 and E5. The BLACK*TA_USE interaction term is significant in all models, indicating 
that the returns to tuition assistance are different for African-Americans compared to 
whites. In particular, African-American recruits who participate in TA are more likely to 
reenlist than white TA-users by about 13.6 percentage points (or 20%). If African-
Americans choose to participate for different reasons than whites, then this difference 
may be due to unobserved heterogeneity rather than TA participation. However, among 
African-Americans, those who participate in TA are also more likely to reenlist than non-
participant African-Americans by about 14.4 percentage points (or 21%).  
Promotion models indicated earlier that African-Americans were less likely to 
promote.  Since the models hold constant AFQT scores, this could be due to other 
unobserved characteristics. Results in Table 13 indicate that African-Americans who 
participate in TA are just as likely to promote to E4 as whites who participate in TA. 
Therefore, it appears that TA usage helps minorities close the promotion gap. In fact, 
among African-Americans, those who participate in TA are far more likely to promote to 
E4 by about 17 percentage points (or 28%). When looking at promotion to E5, however, 
the black-white difference re-appears. Among TA-users, African-Americans promote at 
a rate that is 4.7 percentage points lower than that of white TA-users (or 22%). 
However, TA continues to benefit minorities; among African-Americans, those who 
participate in TA are 6.9 percentage points (or 33%) more likely to promote to E5. 
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Since TA usage may be positively correlated with other characteristics that 
influence job performance (such as motivation), these models are re-estimated using 
the restricted sample of TA users, with course completion as the treatment of interest. 
Panel B presents the estimates. In these models, the interaction terms 
(BLACK*PASS_COURSE) are insignificant, indicating that the different returns to TA-
usage for African-Americans may have been due to unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, race differences remain significant. Among TA users, African-American 
course completers are 9.6 points more likely to reenlist than white course completers (or 
14%). Among African-American TA users, course completers are 7.8 points more likely 
to reenlist (or 11.5%).  
With respect to E4 promotion, African-Americans are less likely to promote than 
whites; however, the promotion gap is insignificant when focusing on course 
completers. Among African-Americans, course completers are more likely to promote 
than African-Americans who use TA but who do not complete their studies. This 
promotion advantage, however, is only 4.5 points (7.4%), which is much smaller than 
the 17 points (28%) estimated with the full sample. This suggests that motivation may 
play a large role in estimating the effect of TA usage on minority outcomes.  The results 
in Panels A and B vary little when looking at promotion to E5. The black-white gap in 
promotion rates remains about 4.3 points (20%) for course completers. Among African-
Americans, course completion boosts E5 promotion rates by 4.6 points (22%).  
Next we turn to the effect of TA usage on females. Table 14 displays the results 
of models with interaction terms using both the entire sample (Panel A) and the 
restricted sample of TA users (Panel B). The interaction terms Female*TA_USE and 
Female*Pass_Course are significant in most models, suggesting that the returns to TA 
participation differ significantly by gender. With respect to retention, women who use TA 
are 13.4 percentage points more likely to reenlist than women who do not use TA (or 
19.7%). However, because women, in general, are less likely to reenlist, women who 
use TA are 2.4 points less likely to reenlist than men who use TA (or 3.5% less). With 
respect to E4 promotion, TA usage appears to improve promotion rates for women. 
Results in Panel A, column 2 indicate that women who do not use TA are 5.7 
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percentage points (about 9%) less likely to promote than men who do not use TA. 
However, women who use TA are 1.8 points (or 3%) more likely to promote to E4 than 
male TA-users. Among women, TA usage appears to boost promotion rates by 19.3 
points or 32%. However, when looking at E5 promotion, the gender gap reappears. 
Women appear less likely to promote than men by 18% (for non-TA users) and by 24% 
(for TA-users). However, among women, TA usage boosts promotion rates by 6.4 
points (30%).  
These differences, however, may be potentially due to differences in unobserved 
characteristics between men and women who participate in TA. Panel B restricts 
attention to TA users and investigates the differential impact of successful course 
completion between women and men on performance. Among TA users, women who 
do not complete courses are even less likely to reenlist than men (12%), compared to 
the 6.7% differential observed with the full sample. The gender gap in retention has 
increased somewhat even after focusing on course completers. However, women who 
complete TA courses are more likely to reenlist than women who do not complete at 
least one course (by 13%). This indicates that TA usage may have a positive effect on 
female retention, but this effect may be prone to endogeneity bias. These results also 
seem to indicate that TA may be a very important reason for women to join and remain 
in service, since the gender retention gap is about twice as large when studying course 
completion than when focusing on any TA use at all. The gender gap in promotion 
probabilities does not change much after restricting the sample. However, TA continues 
to have a positive (although much smaller) effect on female promotion rates.  
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Table 13.   The Effect of VOLED on Minorities 














BLACK 0.0931 -0.0252 -0.0357 BLACK 0.0773 -0.0308 -0.0438 
 (0.0033)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0016)***  (0.0119)*** (0.0125)** (0.0079)*** 
TA USE 0.1016 0.1382 0.0798 PASSED COURSE 0.0596 0.0254 0.0457 
 (0.0036)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0030)***  (0.0073)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0057)*** 
BLACK * TA USE 0.0427 0.0302 -0.0111 BLACK * PASS COURSE 0.0187 0.0195 0.0004 
 (0.0066)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0049)**  (0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0091) 
        
Black participants vs.  0.1358 0.0049 -0.0468 Blacks who pass vs.  0.0959 -0.0112 -0.0434 
white participants (0.0060)*** (0.0065) (0.0047)*** whites who pass (0.0063)*** (0.0068) (0.0049)*** 
        
        
Black participants vs.  0.1443 0.1684 0.0686 Blacks who pass vs.  0.0783 0.0450 0.0461 
black non-participants (0.0056)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0039)*** blacks who do not pass (0.0108)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0070)*** 
        
Notes: All interaction effects are estimated via linear probability models with 
robust standard errors. The differences in outcomes between participant vs. 
non-participant minorities and minority vs. non-minority participants are 
obtained by including separate categories for each minority-VOLED 
combination in linear probability models and by leaving out the appropriate 
control group. All models include controls for demographics. 
 ***significant at the 1%; **significant at the 5%; *significant at the 10%. 
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Table 14.   The Effect of TA on Females 
Panel A.            Sample: ALL Panel B.  Sample: TA USERS 











FEMALE -0.0466 -0.0570 -0.0379 FEMALE -0.0810 -0.0324 -0.0444 
 (0.0035)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0017)***  (0.0108)*** (0.0110)*** (0.0070)*** 
TA USE 0.0226 0.0752 -0.0132 PASSED COURSE 0.0471 0.0166 0.0473 
 (0.0061)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0043)***  (0.0062)*** (0.0065)** (0.0049)*** 
FEMALE * TA  USE 0.1113 0.1173 0.0773 FEMALE*PASS_COURSE  0.0456 0.0457 0.0003 
 (0.0031)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0026)***  (0.0118)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0080) 
        
Female vs. male   -0.0240 0.0183 -0.0510 Females who pass vs.  -0.0353 0.0133 -0.0441 
participants (0.0050)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0039)*** males who pass (0.0051)*** (0.0053)** (0.0039)*** 
        
        
Female participants vs.  0.1339 0.1926 0.0642 Females who pass vs.  0.0927 0.0623 0.0477 
female non-participants (0.0053)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0034)*** females who do not pass (0.0101)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0063)*** 
        
Notes: All interaction effects are estimated via linear probability models with 
robust standard errors. The differences in outcomes between participant and 
non-participant minorities and minority vs. non-minority participants are 
obtained by including separate categories for each minority-VOLED 
combination in linear probability models and by leaving out the appropriate 
control group. All models include controls for demographics. 
 ***significant at the 1%; **significant at the 5%; *significant at the 10%. 
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Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
In this section we analyze the financial costs and benefits of the TA program 
based on our estimated program effects on retention and job performance.  In 
assessing the benefits derived from the retention effects we follow the approach in 
Garcia et al. (2002)  Of the sailors who entered in the cohorts we analyzed, the TA 
usage rate is about .23 (among survivors).  Of these, approximately 80% complete 
their courses, which is about 18.4% of all first-term sailors.  Above (see Table 9) we 
found that successful participation in the TA program increased retention to the 5-
year point by about 6.2 percentage points (or roughly 9%).  Thus, our estimates 
suggest that the TA program, based on successful participants, increases overall 
first-term retention by about 1.14 points.  To determine the monetary value of this 
increase in retention we can base it on the cost savings to the Navy from the higher 
retention generated via this program versus the retention from an alternative 
program that would generate the same retention improvement.  There are several 
available estimates of the cost to the Navy of increasing first-term retention via 
paying higher selective reenlistment bonuses (SRB).  For example, Moore, Golding, 
and Griffis (2001) argue that increasing reenlistment rates by 2 percentage points 
costs the Navy between $66 and $157 million annually.  More recent figures in 
Hansen and Wenger (2003) suggest that this figure is about $86.6 million.  If we use 
the more recent estimate of $86.6 million as a lower bound and $157 million as an 
upper bound, the TA program saves the Navy somewhere between $49 and $117 
million.  When these cost savings are compared to annual TA program expenditures 
of $95 million, the program would not be cost-effective using the lower-bound 
estimate but would be cost-effective using the upper-bound estimate. 
However, the direct retention effect is only one economic benefit of the 
program to the Navy.  Hansen and Wenger (2003) argue that increased reenlistment 
rates also produce a more senior force, which increases individual performance and 
unit readiness.  Their study attempts to estimate the monetary value of the additional 
productivity gain to the Navy of the added experience.  Based on data from civilian 
 - 42 - 
workers, Hansen and Wenger estimate productivity increases for sailors in the 4% 
range for every year of additional service (beyond the first term of service).  When 
they apply this percentage to individual ratings, Hansen and Wenger estimate, on 
average, a 1 percentage-point increase in reenlistment rates generates additional 
productivity gains per year, per sailor of between $1,900 and $1,600 (depending on 
rating).  If we apply the average ($1,750) per person productivity gain to the 
population of additional reenlistees generated by the TA program (approximately 
2,280), we obtain seniority benefits of approximately $4 million per year. 
However, all the above calculations are based solely on benefits derived from 
the higher retention.  Our analysis also found that promotion rates of TA users 
during their first term of service tend to be higher non-TA participants.  We can 
assume that individual productivity increases as rank and responsibilities increase.  
Promotion in the Navy is based on promotion points, which are based on factors 
such as test scores and supervisor evaluations.  Hence, promotion reflects the 
Navy’s assessment of an individual’s on-the-job performance. We are not aware of 
any studies on the direct productivity advantage associated with increased enlisted 
promotion, but we can assume as a first approximation that a promotion is as least 
as valuable as 1 year of additional experience ($1,750).  We further assume that 
those who are promoted to E4 spend 1 year in that pay grade during their first term 
of service as do those who are promoted to E5 (again, in comparison to those who 
are not promoted).  If we use the estimated promotion advantage to TA users 
(observed to be 3 percentage points to E4 and 5 points to E5 in Table 10) and apply 
this to the relevant populations, a promotion-related productivity effect of $1.16 
million for the TA-related E4 promotions and $3.06 million for E5 promotions is 
obtained. 
Summing the benefits based on the additional reenlistments, the additional 
seniority, higher E4 promotion rates and higher E5 promotion rates, the total 
monetized annual benefits associated with the TA program are between $57 million 
(using the lower-bound retention benefit) and $125 million (using the upper-bound 
retention benefit).  Based on annual TA expenditures of $95 million, incorporating 
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the benefits associated with additional job productivity and higher promotion rates 
does not change our basic conclusion on program cost-effectiveness—the program 
is not cost-effective if the lower-bound retention benefits estimate is used, but is 
cost-effective if the upper-bound estimate is used. 
However, to this point the analysis omits numerous benefits that cannot be 
quantified or analyzed.  The most salient of these is the potential recruiting impact of 
the TA program.  A significant proportion of new enlistees respond in surveys that 
their enlistments were motivated by the availability of subsidized college education in 
the military.  The financial benefit to the Navy would be the potential reductions in 
other enlistment incentives or recruiting resources that could be achieved due to 
additional recruits generated by the TA program.  As an illustration, Cylke, Hogan 
and Mackin, (2000) estimate that each additional $1 million spent on enlistment 
bonuses generates enough additional enlistments to save between 18-20 recruiters 
per year, saving the Navy between $220-320 million.  To apply this to the TA 
program, suppose that each $1 million spent on TA were to increase enlistments 
commensurate with a similar increase in enlistment bonuses.  In this case, the TA 
program would be highly cost-effective based solely on the recruitment benefit.  Of 
course, it is unlikely that $1 million of TA expenditures would have a commensurate 
recruiting effect as an enlistment bonus program.  However, it is plausible that the 
entire $95 million annual TA expenditure would have at least the same effect as $1 
million spent on enlistment bonuses.  If the entire TA program enhanced recruiting 
sufficiently to eliminate 18-22 recruiters, the ratio of benefits to costs for the TA 
program would be between 3:1 and 2:1, based solely on the recruiting benefits.   
Other effects of the TA program also are difficult to quantify but must be 
weighed in a full cost-benefit analysis.  Garcia and Joy (1998) point out that the 
Navy’s Voluntary Education program helps sailors increase their ASVAB scores, 
which directly contributes to their attending A-School and changing from lower-
skilled to high-skilled ratings.  Their analysis found that Voluntary Education 
participants were 3 times as likely to change their ratings as non-participants.  We 
can assume that the VOLED program is a relatively efficient method of increasing 
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the number of sailors in more technical ratings as compared to recruiting them 
directly (Cylke et al., 2000) 
Another potential benefit that has not been previously analyzed is the effect of 
the TA program on the ability of sailors to apply for and complete officer 
commissioning programs.  Since TA increases the number of college credits and 
allows sailors to assess their chances of successfully completing a degree, it should 
increase the rate of applications for enlisted-to-officer commissioning programs, 
such as the Seaman-to-Admiral program. Again, to the extent that this effect is 
positive, we assume that TA is more cost-effective in generating additional officers 
than alternative methods. 
Finally, our analysis found that the TA program has a differential positive 
effect on African-American and female sailors as compared to other demographic 
groups.  Improvements in the promotion and reenlistment rates of these 
demographic groups make an important contribution to the achievement of the 
Navy’s diversity goals.  While the value of this benefit cannot be reliably evaluated in 
monetary terms, it should be given a significant weight in a full cost-benefit analysis. 
On balance, based on the benefits we quantified, the TA program was found 
to be cost-effective if we use the upper-bound retention effect based solely on its 
positive retention effect.  The program is not cost-effective when we use the lower-
bound retention benefit estimate.  However, it is our judgment that the benefits we 
have quantified and monetized, in combination with the incommensurables—
including the potential recruiting benefit, the contribution to the Navy’s diversity 
goals, the increases in cross-ratings to more technical rating and the increases in 
enlistee applications to officer commissioning programs—are sufficient to render the 
program cost-effective on normal financial criteria. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study analyzes the effects of participation in the Navy’s Tuition 
Assistance (TA) program on enlistees’ reenlistment and promotion outcomes.  The 
analysis indicates that sailors who use TA for college reenlist at higher rates than 
those who do not use it. The mean reenlistment rate for the sample is 39.1%, but 
among those who use TA the reenlistment rate is 54.6percent.  Successful 
completion of courses may be correlated with ability and motivation; therefore, these 
results may be biased upward.  To mitigate this problem, all models were 
conditioned on AFQT test scores. Sailors who participate in TA also exhibit a higher 
likelihood of advancing to E-4 or E-5 by the end of their fourth year of service.  The 
promotion rates to E-4 and E-5 among the sample are 37.4 and 10.7%, respectively.  
For sailors who use TA, promotion rates are 42.6 and 14.8% to E-4 and E-5, 
respectively.  Successful completion of at least one class has a positive effect on the 
E-4 promotion rate. 
This analysis confirms the positive relationship between reenlistment (i.e., 
retention) and educational opportunities found in a previous study conducted by 
CNA (Garcia et al., 1998).  Garcia et al. found that sailors who used TA were more 
likely to reenlist.   Additionally, the availability of more recent data that focuses on TA 
enrollments, participation, and completion rates, and the exclusion of sailors who 
attrite prior to their reenlistment opportunity make this analysis a refinement of 
CNA’s study. 
Buddin and Kapur (2002) found that service members who participate in TA 
are actually less likely to reenlist, suggesting that TA users are more likely to leave 
the Navy after their first-term of service for better job opportunities. The data used in 
our study was insufficient to reproduce the instrumental variable approach used to 
control for selection bias in the Buddin and Kapur study. The findings presented here 
confirm RAND’s theory that inclusion of sailors who attrite will upwardly bias the 
apparent effect of TA use on retention (i.e., causing the effect of TA use to be 
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overestimated). However, in this analysis (unlike RAND’s), the effect of TA use on 
retention and promotion remained positive. 
Although the college courses that sailors complete under the TA program are 
building general human capital, our results suggest sailors do not use TA to prepare 
for civilian jobs.  Rather, they are building human capital and skills for Navy jobs, 
which offers returns to the Navy in improved retention and on-the-job performance.  
Our estimates suggest the TA program is cost-effective under certain reasonable 
assumptions, but it is not cost-effective under all assumptions.  However, when the 
various potential effects of the program are weighed in the cost-benefit analysis, 
including those that we were not able to quantify or monetize, we are confident that 
the program is a cost-effective alternative to other programs that also impact 
retention, promotion, and the other outcomes.  For example, the program is likely to 
improve recruiting, which saves recruiting resources. In addition, the results indicate 
that TA promotes diversity goals because women and minorities are more frequent 
users of TA and members of these groups who use TA have higher reenlistment and 
promotion rates.  
Recommendations 
In a recent Navy Education Quick Poll (2006) over 84-95% of respondents in 
pay grades E2-E7 reported that that a college degree would benefit them 
professionally (Uriell et al.).  Moreover, a clear majority in all three pay grade 
groupings (E2-E3, E4-E5, and E6-E7) agreed with the statement that “Educational 
Opportunities in Navy Positively Impact My Decision to Make Navy a Career.”  
However, respondents also reported significant obstacles to TA participation; 78%-
83% of those in pay grades E2-E5 reported it was not “easy to schedule courses.” 
The most common reasons cited for difficulties in scheduling classes were a “lack of 
time” and “conflicts between work and education.”  (Uriell et al.  Both factors were 
cited by roughly half of all respondents in all pay grades.  Another barrier sailors 
identified was the “annual TA limit.” 
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The results in this paper suggest that the Navy should consider policies that 
encourage TA participation and, in particular, that encourage course completion by 
those who enroll in college classes. Sailors’ suggestions on what could be done to 
make it easier to obtain a college degree seem to provide a base for 
recommendations to policy makers.  Sailors recommended three top policies:  
provide time off for classes during duty hours, provide more flexible work schedules 
that accommodate courses, and increase TA reimbursement rates. In particular, 
they recommended fully funding TA for degree completion and removing the 16-
semester credit hour annual maximum.  Finally, the results strongly suggest that 
sailors should be encouraged to use educational counseling services at Navy 
College Offices and to develop an individual educational plan.  This plan would 
assist in identifying the proper class in which to enroll and help increase course 
completion rates.  Finally, the Navy should consider a more sailor-friendly policy of 
granting waivers for classes that sailors were unable to complete due to work-related 
reasons.  Sailors must deploy and work schedules change frequently.  Sailors 
should not be penalized for such changes or their incentives to use the TA program 
may be reduced. 
Although this study has extended and improved on existing research on the 
Navy’s program, a number of topics remain for future research.  To date, all 
research on this program has been conducted on first-term sailors.  However, the 
highest usage of the program is among sailors in their second-terms and later.  It 
remains to determine what the impact of TA is on these more-senior sailors, 
measured perhaps in terms of their retention for a career, promotion speed, and 
probability of achieving Chief Petty Officer, Limited Duty Officer and Chief Warrant 
Officer ranks.  In addition, the effect of the program of increasing officer 
commissions among this group remains a topic for future study. 
Within the group of first-term enlistees, other work remains to be done.  The 
effects of the program on cross-ratings to more technical ratings needs to be re-
estimated and compared to the early research by Garcia et al. (2002).  The impact of 
the program on applications for officer commissioning programs has yet to be 
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analyzed.  Finally, a separate study needs to be conducted on the potential effect of 
the program on recruitment.  Analyzing the impact of the program on recruiting may 
require the use of a survey approach. 
In Spring 2008, the Navy announced its new “Education and Learning 
Strategy” (Faram, 2008). This was preceded by the introduction of the new “Life-
Work Balance Strategy”. The Tuition Assistance and the overall Voluntary Education 
program will play a key role in the implementation of these strategies.  In terms of 
the Education and Learning Strategy, TA will need to be used by many sailors to 
acquire the additional rating-related skills needed to advance in their career paths 
and to achieve higher pay grades.  To the extent that the Navy intends to count 
advanced education toward promotion, especially in the highest pay grades, sailors 
must have ready access to college courses and the completion of Associates and 
Bachelor’s degrees for this strategy to succeed.  Similarly, the Life-Work Balance 
Strategy envisions similarly making education more readily available to sailors to 
improve their quality of work life and their attitudes toward Naval Service.  In 
general, the Navy must increase its commitment to funding the program and finding 
ways for sailors to improve their access to the program. 
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Appendix Table A 
 Dependent Variable: Reenlist 
 (1) (2) 
Any TA Used 0.678 0.264 
 (0.007)*** (0.002)*** 
Female -0.171 -0.067 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)*** 
Black 0.196 0.078 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)*** 
Hispanic 0.099 0.039 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** 
Native American 0.011 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.006) 
Asian 0.376 0.149 
 (0.012)*** (0.005)*** 
Other race 0.079 0.032 
 (0.027)*** (0.011)*** 
Single, with kids 0.043 0.017 
 (0.012)*** (0.005)*** 
Married, no kids 0.051 0.020 
 (0.074) (0.030) 
Married, with kids 0.178 0.071 
 (0.012)*** (0.005)*** 
Age 0.009 0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
CAT I 0.245 0.097 
 (0.011)*** (0.005)*** 
CAT IIIA -0.222 -0.088 
 (0.006)*** (0.003)*** 
CAT IIIB -0.268 -0.105 
 (0.006)*** (0.002)*** 
CAT IV -0.045 -0.018 
 (0.114) (0.045) 
CAT unknown -0.251 -0.098 
 (0.060)*** (0.023)*** 
High school  -0.202 -0.079 
dropout (0.014)*** (0.005)*** 
GED -0.195 -0.076 
 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** 
College degree 0.051 0.020 
High school  (0.030)* (0.012)* 
dropout -0.153 -0.060 
 (0.023)*** (0.009)*** 
fy95 -0.088 -0.035 
 (0.011)*** (0.004)*** 
fy96 0.045 0.018 
 (0.011)*** (0.004)*** 
fy97 0.194 0.077 
 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** 
fy98 0.256 0.102 
 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** 
fy99 0.232 0.092 
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 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** 
fy00 0.159 0.063 
 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** 
fy01 0.064 0.025 
 (0.010)*** (0.004)*** 
Constant -0.417  
 (0.022)***  
Observations 267815 267815 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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